We discuss a class of proofs of Bell-type inequalities that are based on tables of potential outcomes. These proofs state in essence: if one can only imagine (or write down in a table) the potential outcome of a hidden parameter model for EPR experiments then a contradiction to experiment and quantum mechanics follows. We show that these proofs do not contain hidden variables that relate to time or, if they do, lead to logical contradictions that render them invalid.
We have reported in previous publications [1] , [2] , [3] that the proofs of Bell-type inequalities [4] come to a halt if setting dependent and time-related hidden instrument parameters are admitted and we have concluded that therefore the Bell inequalities may not be general enough to directly relate to Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR)-type of experiments [5] because these may encompass certain time dependencies. We summarize only some essential elements of our reasoning and assume that the reader will be familiar with our work, particularly [3] , and with our notation.
In this paper, we address additional proofs of Bell-type inequalities including the well known types described in the book of Peres (BP) [7] and a recent proof of Gill, Weihs, Zeilinger and Zukowski (GWZZ) [8] . We show below that the inclusion of time-related parameters invalidates these proofs too.
Before dealing with the proofs as given in BP and GWZZ, we briefly review our general objections to derivations of Bell-type inequalities when time-related parameters are involved. Consider random variables A = ±1 in station S 1 and B = ±1 in station S 2 that describe the potential outcome of spin measurements and are indexed by instrument settings that are characterized by three-dimensional unit vectors a, d in station S 1 and b, c in station S 2 . The key assumption of Bell [6] was that the random variables A, B depend only on the setting in the station and on another random variable Λ that characterizes the spin of particles emitted from a common source. The possible choices of Λ are restricted by Bell [6] invoking Einstein locality arguments. We present these arguments based on the following definitions and remarks: (a) We define Einstein locality by the following postulate: no influence can be exerted by actions in one station S 1 on events in a spatially separated station S 2 (and vice versa) with a speed that exceeds that of light in vacuo.
(b) We assume that the experiments correspond to the ideal assumptions of Bell: The actual instrument settings a, d in station S 1 and b, c in station S 2 are chosen randomly (the randomness being guaranteed according to taste by a computer, a person with free will, a quantum mechanical measurement system or Tyche) and after the correlated pair has been emitted from the source (delayed choice [8] ).
(c) The conditions in Bell's mathematical model are not necessary to fulfill these definitions and assumptions. Bell's conditions, however, are sufficient and can be expressed as follows: the source parameters Λ do not depend on the settings a, b, c, d and the functions A, B only depend on the setting of their respective station and not on that of the other. Bell further requires that Λ has a probability distribution ρ that remains unchanged over the whole run of experiments. For a given setting in each station, this means that the random variables A and B occur with frequencies that are related to ρ(Λ) in both stations. It is instructive to regard the pair Λ, a on which the function A depends as a new setting dependent parameter. Then Bell's approach does contain setting dependent parameters. However, their density is identical to that of Λ [6] .
(d) Our mathematical model also suffices to obey Einstein locality. However, we add to Bell's model setting and time-dependent parameters e.g. Λ * a,t in station S 1 and Λ * * b,t in station S 2 that can, in any experimental run, have a frequency of occurrence or density that is independent of that of Λ. This density will depend only on the setting of the respective station (e.g. a in S 1 and b in S 2 ) and not on the density of the source parameters. The time dependence of the parameters is necessary to fulfill certain additional requirements e.g. that we have for the same setting a in both stations A a = −B a with probability one [4] . Clearly, our mathematical model contains that of Bell as a special case and still obeys Einstein locality. Naturally clocks in the different stations can show correlated, even identical, times without violating Einstein locality which only requires that no influences are exerted with a speed faster than that of light in vacuo.
Below we discuss time-related parameters as we have previously done [3] . In addition we present critiques of the BP and GWZZ proofs according to the following three categories: (i) Time related parameters are excluded. This leads to the classical proofs of Bell-type inequalities [6] . In our opinion such models are not general enough to be compared with actual EPR experiments.
(ii) The random variables A, B and the joint probability distributions are assumed to be time-dependent. Then, if we account for the fact that only one pair of settings can be chosen in S 1 , S 2 at the time of measurement of any given correlated pair, we show that Bell-type inequalities cannot be proven by the known methods [6] [7] .
(iii) Probabilities for time-dependent potential (not actual!) outcomes are considered for each of four different settings at the same time for the same correlated pair. The resulting inequalities (see Eq.(11) below) are always valid. They also remain valid if potential violations of Einstein locality are admitted. If, however, a transition is made from the potential outcomes to the actual outcomes or data, then one needs to include the fact that at a given time only one pair of settings is possible. Hence we are back to case (ii).
We proceed now to review some of the essential features of the proofs of Bell-type inequalities [6] . A key element in all proofs is the quantity ∆:
At this point, possible dependencies of A, B on quantities other than the settings a, b, c, d are left open. The Bell theorem states that no hidden parameters exist that obey Einstein locality. To prove the theorem one first shows that the following inequality holds if all elements of Eq. (1) obey Einstein locality:
where < ... > indicates long-time averages and |...| the absolute value. Then one uses the fact that the long-time averages of actually measured data that correspond to | < ∆ > | contradict the inequality of Eq. (2) and one concludes that the Bell theorem, stating that no local hidden variables can describe the experiments [6] , is valid. Any proof of the kind described above must permit that the inequality of Eq.(2) be violated if parameters are involved that do not obey Einstein locality. Because, if this cannot be proven, then there is no possibility left to explain how the experimental results can violate Eq.(2). We describe below two ways how violations of the inequality can be accomplished: Assume with Bell that the random variables A, B depend in turn on the source parameterrandom-variables Λ that are independent of the settings (Einstein locality!). Assume further that the settings are randomly chosen. Then one can perform a thought experiment in which all the random variables above assume values that then can be compared with experimental data. Because of the assumption that Λ does not depend on settings one can always reorder the random variables of the thought experiment in rows of four with the same value Λ i that Λ has assumed for each row:
This equation follows from the obvious fact that for any four numbers ξ, η, ζ, κ = ±1 we have
The inequality of Eq. (2) is an immediate consequence of Eq.(3). The difficulty of proving the inequality when parameters are invoked that do not obey Einstein locality is also easy to show. Just insert for Λ i a parameter that depends on the setting of the other station. Then, Our point of view is, and this is the essence of our approach, that the same effects that spatially non-local parameters have can also be achieved by time-dependencies. Any difference or change in setting requires a different time of measurement. This is because, according to relativity (the finite speed of light), changes in settings require a non-zero duration of time. If a time-dependence is included in the functions A, B we have:
and again the proof does not go forward.
We have shown in our previous publications, that the use of time-dependencies fulfills also all other requirements to produce a model for EPR experiments. However, GWZZ [8] suggested that time was simply irrelevant. Their proof is similar to the well known BP proofs [7] . As we show below, neither the reasoning in BP nor that of GWZZ renders time irrelevant and violations of their proofs that can be achieved by violations of Einstein locality can also be achieved by the introduction of time-dependencies.
The starting point of BP is the following table of random variables A = ±1, B = ±1 that describe the potential outcome of spin measurements. At this point, we leave the possible time-dependence of A, B open and just indicate the possible time (or time-period) of measurement at the beginning of each row. We also show at the beginning of each row a random variable Λ that represents the information on spin that is sent out from a common source to the two spin analyzer stations. In the actual experiments, only one setting per station can be chosen at a given time. However, the table shows not the actual data but only the random variables listed for the same time. Note also that the table has only the form of a matrix but we do not perform any matrix manipulations here. The right hand side of the table leaves space for possible results that the rows of the tables add up to.
In order to form the necessary averages that lead to the spin pair correlations one needs to sum the columns of the AB products above. To obtain Eq.(2), one needs to average the row-sums. Note, however, that if actual outcomes would be discussed and not just potential outcomes, then for each time only one particular setting can be chosen and only one element of each row contributes to the average of the measurement outcomes. This point is essential and we will return to it below.
BP does not discuss the role of time but assumes in the derivations, with Bell and others, that the values that the random variable Λ can assume do not depend on the settings. Therefore Table (7) can be reordered and listed with the same value that the random variable Λ may assume indicated for each row. As mentioned, the possibility of reordering is an immediate consequence of Einstein locality of the source parameters Λ that is guaranteed by the special precautions of delayed choice EPR-experiments as described e.g. in [8] . One can then write the table for the values that the random variables A, B may assume together with the values that the variable Λ may assume in the following way :
By Eq.(3), each row of AB products added up (with the sign as given) equals ±2. Averaging all the columns and rows one obtains a Bell-type inequality of the type of Eq.(2) for the potential outcomes (for the values the random variables may assume). Because all these potential outcomes may indeed correspond to real outcomes, one may be tempted to compare the result with EPR experiments. However, the parameter space is not general enough to compare its result with an experiment that may include time-dependencies. Had BP permitted time-dependencies of the random variables and included a time index, then the elements of the reordered rows of four in Table (8) have all different time indices and may all assume different values. Then the equality to ±2 cannot be deduced in any row. Consequently the proof of the inequality fails.
At this point, however, one may ask the question whether the above arguments involving the potential values of random variables cannot be extended to include time. Indeed they can. Write each row with the same time index and create the whole table of possible outcomes for a given value Λ i :
Now repeat the table for all possible Λ i and the Bell-type inequalities for all these possible outcomes are confirmed. However, the number of elements of this theory, i.e. of the above listed values that the random variables may assume, exceeds the number of values of actual experiments by at least a factor of four, since only one setting per station can be set at a time in real experiments as opposed to thought experiments. Therefore the model for the thought experiment has now no relation to the real experiment because there are only two possibilities: (i) if time is excluded, the derived Bell-type inequalities are not general enough and (ii) if time is included, the derivation of the inequalities makes it necessary to add up many more elements than an actual experiment possibly can have. In passing we note that there exist experimental variations with three measurements which are subject to a slightly modified but overall similar criticism [9] . Four measurements performed at the same time (one shot experiments) that result in a contradiction are not possible. This fact has been discussed in detail by Peres [7] .
We proceed now to the proof of GWZZ [8] . This proof is a slight modification from the one above and it shows an interesting twist. Instead of considering the AB products of the above tables of random variables (or potential outcomes), GWZZ consider the probabilities that the potential outcomes for A and B are equal. Defining, for example, P {A a = B c } as the probability that A a = B c they obtain (their Eq.(6) [8] ):
It is of no concern here which values the random variable Λ may actually assume. These inequalities are indeed always true for the above probabilities of the lists of potential outcomes. Simply notice that for any four random variables ξ, η, ζ, κ = ±1 we have
GWZZ do not introduce time into this equation and claim that time is irrelevant for these probabilities that are related to the potential outcomes for the same correlated pair. They claim "we did not compare actual outcomes under (sic) different settings at different times, but potential outcomes under (sic) different settings at the same time". It is indeed true that they could have added an equal time index e.g. t i (symbolizing a sequence of measurements at times t 1 , t 2 , ..., t N ) to all the probabilities of Eq. (10) One can then introduce action at a distance declaring exactly the two settings of the actual measurement as the cause for this action at a distance. Thus one has e.g. in the first term of Eq.(10) the functions A a (Λ(c)) = B c (Λ(a)) and similar for the other terms. Then all terms are different and the inequality is invalid. Our main point is that exactly the same effect can be accomplished by admitting time dependencies and again considering the actual outcomes. Denote with GWZZ the actual outcome of a given experiment by X in station S 1 and by Y in station S 2 and denote the conditional probability that X = Y for given settings a, b by P {X = Y |ab}. Then GWZZ transform Eq.(10)which is their Eq.(6) into their Eq. (7):
If we now add an equal time index t i symbolizing a sequence of measurements at times t 1 , t 2 , ..., t N as GWZZ claim they can do with impunity we have:
However, this equation contains now a contradiction. For any given time sequence, one can have one given setting only and not four different given settings. As mentioned above, it is also well known that there exists no possibility to obtain a contradiction between a theoretical inequality and a "one shot" experiment [7] . Therefore, Eq.(13) cannot be considered a consequence of N "one shot" experiments. In addition, no experiment that measures 4N events with 4 different settings all measured at exactly the same time has been performed or can possibly be performed. There is also a mathematical inconsistency in the derivations of GWZZ that becomes clear from their longer paper [8] on which their comment is based. GWZZ start from the equation
where they use the indicator function 1{...} for the events. Subsequently they take expectation values on both sides to arrive at Eq.(10) which involves probabilities. However, it is the random events and not their probabilities that are observed (in the sense of statistics).
Therefore the arguments of GWZZ should have been carried out with all the probabilities P replaced by the indicator function 1{...}. As a consequence of such a notational change, it becomes now absolutely clear that only one term can be taken into account in Eq.(12) because only one pair of settings can be chosen in S 1 , S 2 at the time of measurement of any given correlated pair. The inequality can therefore not be derived. An assertion of the type that any 4 probabilities can be added together is, in the present context, meaningless from the vantage point of elementary statistics. If time is of the essence and Eq. (14) is labelled by a given time or time sequence, then the theory for actual outcomes (not just potential outcomes) must not add up elements that cannot possibly correspond to the experiment. This is exactly the situation that we have discussed in connection with the BP proofs. A theory that (in order to form averages) adds up more elements than the experiments can possibly contain cannot serve as a model for these experiments.
We summarize as follows. Any theory that may be compared to EPR experiments needs to be able to violate Bell-type inequalities depending on some fact, be that a violation of Einstein locality, the existence of time-dependencies or both. We have shown that both ways are possible by using models that are based on elementary probability theory. Time dependencies and violations of Einstein locality have very similar consequences. Whether or not a decision between the two can be made, in other words, whether any of these random variables actually do exist in nature cannot currently be decided with certainty. However, the Bell inequalities can also not be used to decide with any certainty against hidden parameters that are local in the sense of Einstein.
